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Finn Kydland, a Dallas Fed consultant since 1994, shared the 2004 Nobel Prize in 
economics with Edward C. Prescott for their groundbreaking work incorporating 
decisionmaking by individuals, households and firms into economic models.
Q. More than three years have passed since 
you won the Nobel Prize. What do you 
remember from that particular moment in your 
life?
A. All of it is still fresh in my mind, everything 
that led up to it, starting with the day it was 
announced, breaking the news to my wife, 
talking to my mother, who told me that six 
or seven journalists had already been to her 
house in Norway, and seeing from the pub-
lished interviews how cool she was about 
it. I was in Norway at the time, giving some 
lectures, and all of those things stand out in 
my mind as much as being in front of the 
king of Sweden and accepting the medal.
Q. Tell me a bit about the actual ceremony.
A. A key event takes place two days before 
the awards ceremony. You give a lecture. You 
have about 40 minutes to talk about your 
work or anything you think is significant in 
relation to the work or why you got the No-
bel Prize. That’s actually the highest-pressure 
thing because there’ll be anywhere from 500 
to 1,000 people in the auditorium, and it’s 
broadcast to anywhere in the world where 
people care to listen to such lectures.
Once that’s over, then everything is just 
fun. On the actual day, the first thing was the 
awards ceremony, with a lot of pageantry 
that led up to receiving the medal from the 
king. When everyone had received the med-
al, we were whisked off to a big dinner for 
more than a thousand people. At the end of 
the dinner, the winners got to speak with the 
king and queen for five minutes, and then it 
was off to the dancing. 
Q. How has your life changed since you’ve 
won the prize?
A. I do get different kinds of invitations now. 
I used to go to universities and present my 
research. Now, I also get invited to give key-
note addresses at conferences or particular 
events,  and  these  are  sometimes  in  quite 
exotic  places,  like  Shanghai,  Taipei,  South 
America and Petra in Jordan. 
But  I  think  the  most  important  thing 
is that I now have easier access to research 
funds. In particular, I got funding for an in-
stitute at the University of California, Santa 
Barbara, where I teach, called the Laborato-
ry of Aggregate Economics and Finance, or 
LAEF. I spent half a day looking for a name 
that would create an acronym that would be 
pronounced the same as “Leif” Eiriksson, the 
great Norwegian explorer who was the first 
European to discover America. 
That’s what the institute is about—ex-
ploration and discovery. We put on confer-
ences that focus on a particular issue, a par-
ticular question, and they turn out to be very 
lively. We had one on households, gender 
and fertility and one on Latin America’s total 
factor productivity puzzle. 
Q. Can you give us a layperson’s version of the 
work that won you the Nobel?
A. The shortest way to describe it is that Ed 
Prescott and I showed how to put people 
into economic models and therefore policy. 
The award was for work we did in the mid- 
to late 1970s. In those days, macroeconomic 
models tended to be systems of equations in 
which researchers used statistical techniques 
to determine the parameters for consump-
tion  functions,  investment  functions,  labor 
supply  functions,  labor  demand  functions 
and so on. 
Around 1973, a two-page story in Busi-
nessWeek  expressed  excitement  about  the 
idea you could use optimal control theory, 
a tool applied in physics, engineering and 
other  sciences,  to  control  the  aggregate 
economy. This was just around the time that 
Prescott and I started our work, and we basi-
cally showed that using such techniques in 
that context isn’t a good idea.
Q. What’s the better idea? 
A. We were explicit about the decisions fac-
ing rational people. Many of the most impor-
tant  decisions  are  very  forward-looking—
accumulating physical capital, accumulating 
human capital, buying long-term bonds and 
so on. We included these kinds of decisions 
in our models.
We put our framework to use in several 
contexts,  and  we  actually  won  the  Nobel 
Prize for two things. One was the application 
of our framework to business cycles, where 
we supposed there were no other sources 
of change beyond technological shocks that 
raise productivity. How much of the busi-
ness  cycles  still  remained?  We  determined 
that these kinds of shocks account for about 
two-thirds of post–World War II economic 
fluctuations.
The  Nobel  committee  also  mentioned 
the  time  inconsistency  of  optimal  policy. 
Being explicit about households’ and busi-
nesses’ decisionmaking allows you to incor-
porate the fact that so many important deci-
sions are forward-looking. They depend, for 
example, on what decisionmakers think the 
government is going to do in the future. An 
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political  pressure  by,  say, 
making  the  central  bank 
independent, have been a 
good thing. 
In some countries, it’s 
clear that the central bank 
is very much under pres-
sure  from  the  rest  of  the 
government. If the bank’s 
head doesn’t do what the other policymak-
ers want him to do, he’s simply replaced. 
There are many countries in which the ten-
ure of the central bank head has been on the 
order of a year or less. In Argentina, for ex-
ample, there were years in which the central 
bank head was replaced five times. 
Q. Obviously, that kind of instability can throw 
off economic performance.
A. Latin America is a very interesting exam-
ple of an area that used to be quite well-to-
do—at least some of those nations. Over the 
past 100 years, they’ve consistently lagged 
further  and  further  behind.  And  there’s  a 
lot to learn from trying to see why that is. 
Even for the past 20 years, one of the most 
depressing graphs I’ve looked at shows the 
physical capital stock in Argentina. The sum 
of factories, machines, office buildings and 
so on per working-age person declined by 
20 percent from 1982 to the early 2000s.
Q. And these declines have something to 
do with policymakers’ inability to take into 
account how people anticipate changes in 
economic policies?
A.  Sometimes  there 
are signs that leaders 
mean well, such as in 
the early 1990s in Ar-
gentina.  But  success 
becomes  difficult  if 
you have lost credibil-
ity among the people 
and among investors, 
not  just  domestically 
but  also  among  for-
eigners  who  other-
wise  might  have  put 
their  money  in  the 
optimal policy would have to take into ac-
count the effect of future policy on current 
decisions. 
When  that  future  arrives,  those  deci-
sions have already been made and there’s 
an unfortunate incentive for governments to 
abandon the optimal policy and replace it 
with one that is better only under the naïve 
assumption that households and businesses 
won’t see it coming. If the public anticipates 
the policy switch, the government is forced 
to implement a policy that is time consis-
tent—there’s  no  incentive  to  later  repudi-
ate it—but potentially much worse than the 
time-inconsistent policy.
Q. What are some of the policy implications 
that come out of this thought process?
A.  While  it’s  important  to  determine  the 
best policies, you have to be consistent over 
time, and that’s difficult in the face of this 
discovery that optimal policy is time incon-
sistent. When they reevaluate policies in the 
future, policymakers will no longer have the 
incentive to take into account the effect on 
decisions that have already been made. In 
the long run, the prediction is that you’ll be 
worse off.
So how can you commit policymakers 
to carrying out consistent policies? We limit 
their discretion with rules designed to en-
courage time consistency. It seems to work 
better  in  the  context  of  monetary  policy 
than fiscal policy. In monetary policy, the at-
tempts to isolate central bank policy from 
country. If you lose that credibility, it’s very 
hard to regain it. And the credibility can eas-
ily be lost if you succumb to what I might 
call the time-inconsistency disease. 
Q. What are your research interests these 
days?
A. They go along several lines. I’m still in-
terested in studying particular nations. I’ve 
looked at Argentina, and it’s a great contrast 
to a country like Ireland. I think there’s a lot 
to learn from a very successful nation like 
Ireland and why in other cases, things go so 
disastrously wrong, as they’ve done in Ar-
gentina. 
In  the  past  two  or  three  years,  I’ve 
been trying to look for mechanisms through 
which money may play a role in the real 
economy. The models with explicit house-
holds and businesses initially applied to real 
economies—what happens to consumption, 
investment, labor input and so on. I guess I 
concentrated on the real economy because 
I view that as most important, but it’s clear 
that one can build monetary factors into the 
economy. It’s difficult, however, to get mon-
etary factors to have much of a role in the 
real economy unless you cheat a little and 
assume  price  rigidity—something  that  I’m 
reluctant to do. 
Another  interesting  project  has  to  do 
with investment in durable household capi-
tal, such as residential construction and pur-
chases  of  automobiles.  It  used  to  be  that 
mortgages and car loans were made at fixed 
interest rates. And the question is whether 
monetary policy in such a circumstance ac-
tually may have had a role in the real econo-
my. That’s still an ongoing project, and given 
the current situation, I wish we had gotten 
further on it.
“The first thing was the awards ceremony, with a lot of pageantry 
that led up to receiving the medal from the king.”